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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STAT.E OF UTAH 
UNIVERSAL INVESTMENT 
001\TPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
C.\HPETS. INCORPORATED, 
D ef enda.nt-.A. p·p·ellant. 
Case 
No.10165 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This was a trial conducted before the District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, before the Honorable· Ray 
\?an Cott and a. jury in which the plaintiff sought recov-
ery for damages due to an alleged breach of warranty, 
said warranty being an express warranty against 
''latent defects, faulty material and/or workmanship" 
(R-7, Exhibit 2), said breach of warranty consisting sole-
I:~ and exclusively of a discoloration of draperies fur-
nished by the defendant to the plaintiff, which as claimed 
by the plaintiff changed their color as noted in the pre-
1 
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trial order "from white to variegated colors" (R-12). 
Plaintiff's complaint sought damages in the amount of 
$7,500.00. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE A TRIAL COURT 
The matter was tried to a jury on April15 through 
17, 1964, and a verdict was returned by the jury in favor 
of the plaintiff in the amount of $3,750.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant made a motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim 
at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence (R-200). It re-
newed said motion again at the time the rna tter was sub-
mitted to the jury, together with a motion for a di-
rected verdict (R-270-271). Following the return of the 
verdict, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, for dismissal and for a new trial (R-43). 
During trial, defendant also moved for the exclusion 
of some testimony, took exception to argument of coun-
sel and requested that the matter he re-submitted to the 
jury, they having left the- jury box at the time the motion 
was made. The court denied or refused all of the above-
mentioned motions, the motion for directed verdict, dis-
missal and new trial being argued before the court on 
May 11, 1964, and the court's minute entry noting the 
order and denial was then entered (R-46). From such 
order and judgment the defendant appeals. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to a written subcontract (Exhibit 1), de-
fendant ag-reed to furnish the plaintiff with certain fin-
i~ht-d draperies to be hung in 100 apartment units then 
under eon~tn1etion by plaintiff, known as the ''Susan Kay 
.\rms" (see Exhibit 11). Said draperies were deliv-
en'd and in~tnlled in plaintiff's apartment houses as they 
wPre completed during the time period beginning Octo-
her 1961, and ending May 1962. At the conclusion of the 
installation and at the time of final payment, which oc-
em-red sometime in June 1962, defendant executed a writ-
tl'll guarantee or warranty titled ''Susan Kay Arms 
Guarantee" (Exhibit 2). This document reaffirms the 
provisions of paragraph 13 in the original subcontract 
rPlating to "latent defects, faulty material and/or work-
man~hip" and extends the guarantee as being valid and 
binding until after the "one year inspection by the Fed-
Pral Housing Commissioner covering the one year guar-
anteP period." Said one year inspection by the F. H. A. 
Commissioner was made on September 16, 1963 (R-85), 
and a 'vritten report on said inspection or a photostatic 
copy thereof was introduced in evidence as Exhibit 5 
(R-84). The warranty period in issue, therefore, was up 
to and including September 16, 1963, as identified in the 
Instruction No. 2 of the court's instructions to the jury 
(R-16). 
Sometime in April of 1962 (while the units were still 
under construction) the draperies in unit 117, the first 
unit occupied sometime in October 1961, became discol-
ored ns indicated by both plaintiff and defendant's wit-
3 
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nesses, the testimony being that iodine or other stain had 
been placed on them. The plaintiff's resident manager, 
Mr. Ronald Sweitzer, took these drapes to Beehive Clean-
ers. The stain not having been removed, Mr. Sweitzer 
contacted defendant, and defendant replaced said cur-
tains and billed plaintiff therefor. (R-92-94) and (R-193-
194) 
No further or other complaint was made by the 
plaintiff regarding the draperies until May 10, 1963, 
approximately one year later, at which time Sweitzer 
wrote a letter to defendant which was introduced as Ex-
hibit 6, stating that approximately one-third of said 
draperies had changed color. On July 2, 1963, counsel 
for the plaintiff mailed a "Notice and Demand" (intro-
duced as Exhibit 4), stating that approximately fifty per 
cent of the draperies were "defective and unsatis-
factory'' and demanding that the same be replaced. On 
October 4, 1963, plaintiff filed this action (R-10). 
Defendant-Appellant will refer to other facts and 
testimony in the course of its argument hereafter. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in the following particulars: 
(A) IN PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF 
THOMAS FRANK REGARDING VALUATION AND 
DAMAGES TO BE INTRODUCED OVER OBJEC-
TION BY COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT. 
(B) IN DENYING DEFENDAT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S EVI-
DENCE. 
4 
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(C) IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE TRIAL. 
(D) IN STRIKING THE FINAL PARAGRAPH 
01~, THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 5 TO THE 
JURY AFTER PREPARING THE SAME AND 
SERVING THEM ON COUNSEL, BUT BEFORE 
READING SAID INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
(E) IN REFUSING TO RECALL THE JURY TO 
REHABILITATE THEM IN CONNECTION WITH 
TWO ERRORS COMMITTED BY COUNSEL FOR 
PlJAINTIFF IN HIS ARGUMENT. 
(F) IN REFUSING TO GRANT JUDGMENT, 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
(G) REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
(A) IN PERMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF 
THOMAS FRANK REGARDING VALUATION 
AND DAMAGES TO BE INTRODUCED OVER 
OBJECTION BY COUNSEL FOR DEFEND-
ANT. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, plaintiff's first 
complaint of discoloring occurred in May 19e.J; approxi-
mately fifty per cent were claimed discolored as of July 2, 
1963; and from the testimony of Mr. Sweitzer, by the 
time he "left as manager of the apartments" (which was 
August 1, 1963-R-90) approximately "99%" had 
ehanged eolor to some degree (R-101). The testimony of 
"jfr. Knight, President of plaintiff corporation, indicated 
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that the draperies in question have continued to be used 
and were in fact used up to and including the time of 
trial (April15, 1964) (R-76). 
It was virtually the agreed testimony of all the wit-
nesses called both by plaintiff and defendant that one of 
the contributing if not principal causes of discoloration 
was exposure to sunlight. Samples of the draperies in 
issue were offered and introduced by plaintiff in evidence 
through the witness Sweitzer, and were received as Exhib-
its 8, 9 and 10. (R. 103-104) It is important to note, how-
ever, that these sample drapes were obtained by Sweitzer 
at the request of plaintiff's counsel in January 1964 
(R-103), and when they were introduced counsel asked in 
each instance ''. . . it is essentially in the same condi-
tion as it was when you procured it and delivered it to 
me~" or "Would you say that it is in substantially the 
same condition as it was when it was delivered to me~" 
or finally, ''And except for the indication of where ther~ 
have been parts of it clipped off, is it essentially in the 
same condition it was when you delivered it to me~" To 
each of these questions, the witness Sweitzer answered 
in the affirmative. The record is absent a;ny testimony 
connecting the condition of the sa,mple drapes with the 
condition of the draperies as of September 16, 1963 -
the end of the warranty period. There is further no 
evidence indicating whether or not the draperies con-
tinued to discolor during the period September 1963 
to April 1964, the time of trial, but rather there is only 
evidence that sunlight affects the discoloration and that 
said draperies remained in use during the said inter-
vening period. 
6 
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The witnl'ss 'l,lwnws Fr~111k made his first and only 
in:-; pt><'l ion () r t bt> pn'miscs and the draperies in issue 
appro.rimaff'!y flt 1o -weeks prior to the trial (R-164-165). 
Gou11sel for the plaintiff, after establishing the inspec-
tion date and inspection, then sought to elicit testimony 
from Frank rt>garding what he saw, and counsel for de-
1\,ndant-a.ppellant objected in the following manner: 
•· 01n. MADSEN: Your Honor, at this point I'm 
!~·oing to object on the grounds that any such tes-
timony about any such inspection made two weeks 
ago as not being related to the point of Septem-
ber 16, the date of the warranty. 
Q. (MR. HAYEs): The testimony is already in the 
record that the drapes were already in the con-
dition they were at the time prior to the expiration 
of the warranty when Mr. Sweitzer ceased being 
the manager." (R-165) 
The statement of counsel for the plaintiff is in error. 
There 'lS 110 such testimony. Accordingly, all of Mr. 
Frank's testimony relating to the condition of the drap-
eries, relating to their value, ete., is incompetent because 
thP said inspection does not relate to the time of war-
ranty. There is no evidence to show that the drapes' 
condition at the time of his inspection was identical or 
substantially the same as they were on September 16, 
1963. This proposition is well stated in Am. Jur. on 
E';idence relating to the introduction of demonstrative 
eridence in the following language: 
• 'It must appear as a preliminary to the introduc-
tion of any object in evidence that it has not sus-
tained any substantial change by reason of lapse 
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of time or otherwise, since the time in issue.'' 
20 Am. Jur ~ 719 
This court adopted essentially that proposition in the 
case of Hayes v. Southern Pacific Rarilroad, 17 Utah 99; 
63 Pac. 1001, in the related field of conducting experi-
ments before the jury and requiring that the same re-
semble in all rna terial particulars the facts as originally 
alleged. See also Konold v. Rio Groode Western Rail-
roa.d, 21 Utah 379, 60 Pac. 1021. 
While it is true that the above cited commentary and 
cases related to the introduction of demonstrative or 
physical evidence rather than testimony about such evi-
dence, certainly the same rule would apply to testimony 
relating thereto as it would to the introduction of the thing 
itself. There being no :foundation in the record to dem-
onstrate that the draperies in issue appeared at the time 
of Mr. Frank's inspection the same as they were as of 
September 16, 1963, all of his testimony in connection 
therewith should not have been permitted to get to the 
jury, particularly in view of the fact that the counsel for 
defendant made timely objection thereto. 
It further appearing that plaintiff's entire valua-
tion testimony came from this witness, said testimony 
being based upon his inspection of two weeks prior to 
the trial, it follows that with his testimony stricken, 
defendant's cause must fail being absent any testimony 
regarding damages. 
(B) IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S EVIDENCE. 
8 
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'rhe plaintiff relied on two principal witnesses to 
show ( 1) that color constituted a part of the express 
wa nanty in issue, and (2) that the discoloration would 
be to n latent defect in the material, for which defend-
ant W<IS liable. Said witnesses were the above-named 
Thomas Frank and a Gordon Harry. From Mr. Harry, 
the plaintiff produced testimony to the effect that pieces 
of the Exhibits 8, 9 and 10 (which again should be ob-
sprved were obtained in January 1964) were subjected 
by him to tests to determine the cause of discoloration. 
That testimony follows: 
"Q. I will ask you further whether or not you 
made tests of those drapes¥ 
A. I did, sir. 
THE CouRT: Tests for what though, Mr. Hayes¥ 
Q. I will ask you whether I asked you to and you 
did, in fact, perform tests to determine the rea-
son for discoloration or changing of color of those 
drapes¥ 
A. We tested them for the discoloration, knowing 
what cat6Sed it; but we tested to prove that it was 
present and it was caused by a fluorescent dye 
which is applied in the manufacture. It is an arti-
ficial brightening. It is in common usage in tex-
tile mills. And they haven't used one that will 
not break down when exposed to light, and this 
is what has happened. The fluorescent dyes have 
decomposed upon the exposure to light. And this 
does not have to be sunlight, although the brighter 
the light the faster it decomposes. But they will 
decompose under fluorescent light." (R.-136) 
(Emphasis added) 
Though he purported to know in advance the cause, 
he nonetheless tested the fabrics and found in them the 
9 
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presence of what he termed ''fluorescent dyes,'' which 
he said must have been placed there during manufacture. 
The said Mr. Harry further testified on cross-examina-
tion that he, just prior to trial, (the Friday before trial, 
April 10, 1964) mailed portions of Exhibits 8, 9 and 
10 to a National Institute of Dry Cleaning for them to 
corroborate his tests, and with some urging produced 
the report of that Institution, which was entered into 
evidence as Exhibit 12 (R-153). 
The said Exhibit 12, while mentioning "fluorescent 
dye" as one of the contributing causes, identifies several 
other causes for the discoloration as well. 
The witness Frank was asked by plaintiff's counsel 
if there were a color change of the nature or type as 
indicated in Exhibits 8, 9 arnd 10, whether or not in the 
industry this would be considered a ''defect.'' His an-
swer was, "It would." (R-168) He was asked further to 
fix a valuation on the draperies in the following manner: 
'' Q. From a decorator's standpoint what would 
you say with regard to the drapes as you saw 
them~ 
A. Well, they are of no value." (R-166) 
On cross-examination, however, he admitted that 
he had not seen the drapes, nor was he aware of their 
condition as of September 16, 1963, or any time before 
that date, (R-178) and that he was assuming that the 
draperies were in the same condition on September 16, 
1963, as they were on the date of his inspection some 
10 
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two weeks prior to the date of the trial, as illustrated by 
the following questions and answers : 
"Q. That is what I mean. Assuming that the 
drapes were in the condition on September 16 as 
of the date you observed them, isn't that your 
assumption 1 
A. Yes sir." (R-180-181) 
On further cross-examination, this witness admitted 
that manufacturers generally make an express warranty 
ns to color if the color is to be warranted by the use of 
tlw words "guaranteed colorfast" as appears in the 
following exchange of questions and answers : 
'' Q. In the majority of instances manufacturers 
of drapery fabrics do not warrant or guarantee 
color of a synthetic fabric, isn't that the case~ 
A. Well, no. At the most they a.re labeled and 
there are some fabrics usually come labeled, some-
times as to the type of dye and they will say 
''guaranteed colorfast.'' You will find this in 
clothing fabrics or upholstery or drapery. Some-
times they are not labeled as such, so that laun-
dering or something may change the color or 
fade them out. Sunlight will sometimes fade the 
fabric. 
Q. Some fabrics therefore, will be changed and 
cannot be guaranteed to hold their color, is that 
so~ 
~\. Yes, that is so. 
Q. And this is particularly true as to synthetic 
fabrics, is that correct 1 By synthetic I am includ-
ing dacron or rayon. 
A. It is the same as any other fabrics, it depends 
upon the dye. It is standard practice because they 
are ,,-arranted. 
11 
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Q. As a matter of fact it is a commonly under-
stood fact in the industry that any fabric ex-
posed to sunlight or even artificial light is going 
to fade or otherwise discolor, that as you sug-
ge~ted cooking odors sometimes, in fact, affect 
the color of a fabric, do they not 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that for these reasons as a matter of 
practice in the trade, particularly with regard to 
synthetic fabrics virtually no manufacturer guar-
antees color of a fabric, isn't that correct1 
MR. HAYES: Now I object to that when you say 
''virtually.'' 
THE CouRT: Let him say. 
A. They will oftentimes warrant for a certain 
amount of time.· They are warranted for an esti-
mated life. The manufacturer has set up stand-
ards of certain things that will last for two years, 
three years, five years. Anything, no matter what 
make of goods is going to deteriorate in color 
sometime. 
Q. Exactly, and so when they do warrant it they 
do sp-ecify it for a particularly limited period of 
tim.e with regard to color, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes." (R-173-174) (Emphasis added) 
The witness then admitted that his valuation testi-
mony wa.s based on the assumption that color was in-
cludable in the warranty in issue in this trial: 
'' Q. And the other characteristics with relation 
to these fabrics, the capacity to hang without sag-
ging, the failure of decomposition, the other areas 
as we have discussed when talking about this; 
12 
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latPnt dd'ects so far as you are aware are un-
<"hanged, isn't that correct 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. rrhere is, in fact, no variation in regard to all 
of those elements as applies to these drapes -
correctT 
A. Yes. 
Q. So your evaluation testimony is assuming that 
color is one of the elements within a warranty, 
and then on the color basis alone you value them 
HH useless as of September 1963, or valueless as 
of September '63 - Correct~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you give a certain use quotient of 
15% to 20% for the period in which they had been 
used up until complaint was made and discolora-
tion occurred - correct~ 
A. Yes." (R-182-183) (Emphasis added) 
On redirect examination plaintiff's own counsel made 
the matter more emphatic with the following series of 
questions: 
'' Q. So if there is no warranty relating to color 
specifically I take it your testimony is not ap-
plicable with regard to the value - correct~ 
A. I think I am getting a little confused here.' 
Q. Well, let me clarify it then - if I can. If 
there was no warranty to keep the color a spe-
cific shade between the parties to this lawsuit 
your valuations would not apply, isn't that cor-
rect~ 
. \. Well yes. Although it would have to be, to 
me a warranty would have to say - we warrant 
all of these things but color then it wouldn't apply. 
13 
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Q. You are saying that you have interpreted 
that there is color in this matter~ 
A. As part of the fabric. 
Q. But that is your assumption. You don't know 
whether or not the parties warranted as to keep-
ing the colors of the fabric~ 
A. Not precisely." (R-185) 
The net result of Mr. Fank's testimony is that he was 
first, a,ssuming that the draperies in issue were discol-
ored in the same particulars on September 16, 1963, as 
they were when he inspected the premises two weeks 
prior to trial (April 1964); and second, that he was 
assuming that color was part of the warranty in this fact 
situation, and based on that assumption the draperies 
were first valueless and then perhaps on reconsideration 
were worth 15% to 20% of their original value. But 
that if his assumption were incorrect and color was not 
warranted here, his valuation testimony was inapplicable. 
He further admitted that when color is warranted in the 
industry, it is done so expressly. 
Appellant wishes here to again emphasize that 
neither Harry's nor Frank's testimony relate to any in-
spection, tests, etc., conducted during or at the con-
clusion of the warranty period in issue, nor was it estab-
lished in the record that such samples as they tested or 
inspected appeared the same as the draperies in issue as 
of September 16, 1963. 
In fact, the only testimony relating to the condition 
of the draperies as of the expiration of the warranty 
period was the testimony of the F. H. A. witness, Mr. 
Ernest Fullmer, produced by the plaintiff. Mr. Fullmer 
14 
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wa~ a supervisor rn tlH·r than the inspector of the project, 
hut he brought with him a photostatic copy of the report 
of the inspector, which was introduced as Exhibit 5. 
Sim·L• IH·, of course, could not testify as to what the in-
spector oh~PtTed or noticed, his testimony is far from 
conelu~ive. The following exchange of questions and 
mu:·nver~, however, throws some light on the report: 
"Q. And, as a matter of fact, how far can the 
F .H.A. go in regard to requiring the owner of an 
income property to replace materials or to make 
modifications in the decorating, specifically as op-
posed to structural changes~ 
A. Well, we can recommend of course that the 
upkeep of the property is such that it will attract 
orrnpancy on the normal basis. If it gets too bad 
the F .H.A. Commissioner has the power to step 
in and take over the property and run it if the 
sponsor is not keeping it up to snuff. 
Q. Then that is the reason for the annual inspec-
tions, is it~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And does this not relate to subsequent in-
stallation of furnishings and other management 
and upkeep, apart from the original contract or 
subcontract of materials furnished~ 
A. Well, with the exception of drapes and car-
pets and things of that sort that have a short 
life the cleaning and maintenance of the drapes is 
left up to the sponsor who does not become a part 
of the reserve replacements. If the drapes were 
Sitch that they did deteriorate or become ragged 
or anytlz,ing like that I'm sure that we would have 
caught this at the tim,e of the inspection. 
Q. And notwithstanding the fact that as of the 
time this contract was drafted, prior to your 
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change in policy of September 1961 had the drapes 
been so defective, as you say, this would have 
been noted and you would have the power to rec-
ommend some change with relation to those drapes 
to the owner~ 
A. Yes sir." (R-87 -88) (Emphasis added) 
In short, nothing defective about the draperies was 
noticed by the inspector of such consequence to require 
that it be put on the report since there is no such indica-
tion on Exhibit 5, and had the draperies been defective, 
the inspector had a right not only to notice it, but to 
recommend changes or remedies to the owner. 
Sections 60-1-12 of the Utah Code defines an ex-
press warranty in the language: ''Any affirmation of 
fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is 
an express warranty ... to induce the buyer to purchase 
. . . relying thereon.'' This court held in the case of 
Park v. Moorman Manufacturing Company, 121 Utah 
339; 241 Pac. 2nd 914, 40 A.L.R. 2d 273, that the question 
of express warranty is properly submitted to the jury 
when the evidence is substantial and supports that essen-
tial element which the plaintiff is required to prove. 
The plaintiff not only failed to show any express oral 
(or written) warranty as to color herein, but further 
failed to produce any evidenee of an implied warranty of 
color or reliance on any such implied warranty by the 
plaintiff, as required by the above-noted statute and case. 
The facts above noted being the sum total of the 
plaintiff's evidence of (1) warranty, (2) breach of war-
ranty, (3) inspection of the product, and ( 4) damages, is 
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so inconclusive, illusory and admittedly based on as-
sumption, that defendant's :Motion to Dismiss should 
han~ been granted. 
(C) IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT MADE AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE TRIAL. 
\Vhen Mr. Claude Thompson, president of defend-
ant corporation, took the stand, he was asked at length 
about the practice in the trade relating to warranting 
color, and he referred to the fact that the words ''color-
fast" were used and attached by way of a label on any 
goods where color was warranted and that absent such 
label, color was not included as an item of warranty 
(R.203-204). Thereafter, following objection of coun-
sel for the plaintiff, the court insisted that Mr. Thomp-
son indicate not what the general custom of the industry 
was, but rather the custom of retailers of draperies. Fol-
lowing that ruling of the court, this exchange in ques-
tions and answers occurred : 
"Q. Well, Mr. Thompson, let us turn it then to 
you in your own practice. What language do you 
use when you warrant the color of a fabric~ 
A. I can never remember ever warranting or 
guaranteeing the color of any fabric. 
Q. Of drapery material~ 
~\.. Of drapery, carpets, or otherwise. 
Q. Is it the custom in your trade generally and 
that of your competitors and others in business 
of the retail sale of fabrics and draperies~ 
.A. Not unless this was otherwise specified. 
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Q. Assuming you would specify would you use 
the language as specified ~ 
A. Always. 
Q. I hand you Exhibit 1 and ask if there is any 
language therein relating to the warrantying of 
the color of the drapery furnished 7 
MR. HAYES: Now I object to that as irrelevant. 
The contract speaks for itself, the subject con-
tract. 
THE CouRT: Well, I think as a. matter of custom 
among his trade or among his business he can 
interpret the meaning. I presume that is what 
part of the litigation is about, is a dispute as to 
what it does or doesn't mean. He may answer in 
that regard. 
A. This mentions nothing about warranty or 
guarantee in any relation to color. The fabric, this 
curtain is not mentioned in that scope.'' (R-205-6) 
Defendant then called one Stephen Holt who, at the 
time of trial, was the owner and proprietor of a retail 
furniture and home accessories store known as Holt's 
Fine Furnishings in Bountiful, Utah. For the five years 
prior to August, 1963, however, Mr. Holt was in the em-
ploy of the Lensol Fabrics, which company was the sup-
plier of the drapery material in question. As to the 
issue of whether or not color was includable in a war-
ranty as a matter of custom in the industry, this wit-
ness was asked the following questions and gave the 
following answers: 
'' Q. Are you aware of the custom of the trade 
with regard to warranting colors in fabrics~ 
A. Yes sir. 
18 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Specifically, synthetic fabrics 1 
.\. Pretty much all types of fabrics. 
Q. And what is the custom in the trade with re-
gard to warranting fabrics as to color~ 
A. The custom is-
l\i[R. HAYES: Now I object to this as there is no 
proper qualification. 
THE CouRT: Well, let us see if he knows what Mr. 
Thompson does and we are not concerned as to 
t lw connection between them and the manufac-
turer because it may be totally different and 
then it wouldn't matter what it was. We are inter-
ested as a custom what men like Mr. Thompson do. 
A. Well, in regards to color when they have this 
problem come up the retailers, the dealers usually 
call us to go out on them. 
Q. I'm talking about the policy with relation to 
the original warranty. 
A. The retailers' warranting color fastness to a 
customer~ 
THE CouRT: Yes. 
A. I have never known of a manufacturer giving 
this warranty to a customer. Retailers will again, 
generally give this warranty. 
Q. Had you heard of a warranty which contained 
sueh language as warranting against latent de-
fects, faulty materials and/ or workmanship, 
would that language be accepted as the custom 
of the trade with relation to retailers to ultimate 
customers-
~\. Xo sir. 
Q - include color~ 
~\. X o. sir." (R-231-2) 
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Defendant finally called as a witness Ray Hughes, an 
expert in the fabric field, having been associated in it for 
forty years, who on the same question of color warranty 
gave the following testimony: 
'' Q. Now with regard to the custom of the trade 
and retailers are you familiar with such lan-
guage as warranting against latent defects, faulty 
materials, or workmanship 1 
A. Well, that is-
Q. Is that language familiar to you 1 
A. No, that just sounds like attorney language. 
Q. Do you know what the phrase "latent defect" 
means generally 1 
A. Latent would be something inside that later 
comes out. 
THE CouRT: Now he says he isn't familiar with it, 
Mr. Madsen. Is there any point in pursuing iU 
Q. No, I suppose not, your Honor. With regard 
to the question of color is color regarded in the 
profession as a defect of either material or work-
manship~ 
A. Is color what~ 
Q. Is color regarded in the trade, in the fabric 
profession among retailers or otherwise as a de-
fect of either material or wokmanship 1 
A. No sir. 
Q. Would you regard the discoloration of these 
drapes a defect, a latent defect or a matter of 
faulty construction - latent defect, faulty ma-
terials and/ or workmanship~ 
MR. HAYES: Now if the Court please, I believe he 
indicated he doesn't know what that language 
means. I object to him answering that question. 
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Q. I asked him first if that was a custom in the 
trade. 
THE CouRT: He said he didn't know and it was 
lawyer talk. 
Q. That's right. 
THE CouRT: Well, I don't think we should have 
his opinion about it, what he considers it. 
Q. Let me simplify it to the w.ord defect. Would 
you consider the discoloration of these drapes a 
defect? 
A. Not in that particular fabric, no." (R-254) 
Counsel for the plaintiff then cross-examined Mr. 
Hughes and elicited further testimony as follows: 
"Q. Would you expect this particular fabric to 
change color and turn that col.orf 
A. It can't change color in and of itself. There is 
no color to it to change. It is pure white. There is 
nothing for it to change to. 
Q. There is nothing for it to change to¥ 
A. No. It would have to be colored from some 
other source. 
Q. Would you expect it to change color in nor-
mal useY 
A. It depends upon what is in the room that the 
drape is in. 
Q. If they were used as drapes you would expect 
it to be subjected to the atmosphere, wouldn't 
youY 
A. Right, absolutely. That is why you can't guar-
antee color. 
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Q. And you would expect it to be subjected to 
the sun, wouldn't you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And household odors ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And even to light itself~ As you said, you 
would suspect it to be subjected to that. 
A. If it is going to change color if chemicals are 
in the air and they attach themselves to the fabric 
then you can't blame the fabric, can you. 
Q. So would you say this is inevitable that this 
change colors~ 
A. In some conditions, yes. 
Q. In every room~ In most rooms would it be 
inevitable~ 
A. It would depend a lot on your heating. We 
have found more trouble with gas heat than any-
thing else. 
Q. So if it were installed in a project that had 
gas heat would it be inevitable that it change 
color. 
A. It would change color. Most any fabric would 
change color some. · 
Q. I think you indicated that cleaning would have 
something to do with it~ 
A. Cleaning could have something to do with it; 
the chemicals in cleaning. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
cleaning did, in fact, have anything to do with 
the change in color in these drapes~ 
A. I wouldn't know what v\-as the cause for the 
change of color. 
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Q. You wouldn't have any iden, ·would you'~ 
A. No sir; it would be the chemicals, whatever 
wn~ in the room or the cleaning flnids. It would 
have to be some outside chemical, different and 
outside of the fabric itself. 
Q. And it couldn't be anything in the fabric 
itself1 
A. No sir. (R-254, 255, 256)" 
This last quote of testimony not only throws addi-
tional light of the subject of warranty as to color and 
wlH.'thor or not discoloration is a defect, but further im-
peaches the testimony of plaintiff's witness Harry as to 
tlw source of the "fluorescent dye." The testimony of 
Hughes, above, is corroborated by the statements of the 
witness Holt as follows: 
''.A.. The mill told me that this particular piece 
of fabric was never subjected to any dye. That it 
is almost in a natural state of when it was woven 
and it is given a slight bleach when it comes off 
the looms and it picks up little dark particles and 
they look like little dust specks all over and the 
bleach is to take that color out. The terminology 
is the exact little spot that appears on fabrics 
when it comes off the looms - well, it is on all 
fabrics and this is when it is bleached. There is 
no dye ever subjected to a white piece of fabric. 
Q. Were you in Court this morning when Mr. 
Harry testified 1 
~-\... Yes sir. 
Q. And did you hear a discussion about bright-
eners being used in connection with bleaches~ 
~l. Yes sir. 
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Q. Brighteners I believe he said had fluorescent 
dye in them~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. But it is your testimony that no dye of any 
kind, is that right, was used in this fabric~ 
A. Just bleach and no dye of any kind. And I 
never heard the term of fluorescent dyes except 
with the uses of brighteners." (R-228-9) 
Both Holt and Hughes, as well as Thompson, indi-
cated in some detail the various causes for discoloration 
and the various sources from which such ''dyes'' or other 
foreign substances could have become attached to or 
infiltrated among the threads of the fabric in issue, 
causing discoloration. In that connection, specifically, 
Mr. Holt testified that it was his company's (Lensol Fab-
rics) policy, that once a piece of fabric had been dry 
cleaned or laundered in any manner, the company could 
uot guarantee it or warranty it in any particular. (R-222) 
The undersigned is well aware of the rule adopted 
and often repeated by this Court that it will not review 
Findings of Fact or verdicts of juries, where there is any 
substantial evidence in support thereof. Appellant main-
tains here that the only evidence in favor of a verdict 
including color within the warranty was the assumption 
of the witness Frank that color is so included, which 
assumption is overwhelmingly rebutted by the testimony 
of Thompson, Hughes and Holt. So, not only did plain-
tiff fail to establish by preponderance of clear and con-
vincing evidence the existence of a warranty against 
color, but that contention is negated by the only 
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<'ompetent evidence which was in direct opposition 
thereto. The lower court should accordingly have 
awa nled a directed verdict to the defendant at the con-
clusion of the trial. 
(D) IN STRIKING THE FINAL PARA-
GRAPH OF THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION 
~0. 5 TO THE JURY AFTER PREPARING 
THE SAME AND SERVING THEM ON COUN-
SEL, BUT BEFORE READING SAID IN-
STRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
Instruction No. 5 as originally prepared by the 
Court Reporter, read as follows: 
''You are instructed that an item of merchan-
dise (curtains in this case) is defective if it does 
not remain in substantially the same condition 
as when sold, or if it ceases to serve the purpose 
for which purchased, whether because of its ap-
pearance or its functional failure. 
In this connection you are further instructed that 
if you find by a preponderance of the evidence 
in this case that the parties hereto have made an 
express warranty in reference to the suitability 
and durability of the merchandise sold herein, 
then you are instructed that the parties are bound 
by the express warranty so made." (R-18) 
This was the instruction as delivered to counsel of 
both parties at the conclusion of the evidence prior to 
the time the court read the instructions to the jury. At 
the time of reading the instructions, the undersigned did 
not note that the court had refrained from reading the 
last paragraph of Instruction No. 5 to the jurors. (See 
Record, P. 264, for the language of the court in reading 
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the Instruction.) Had the written instruction delivered 
to the jury coincided with the instruction read by the 
court, appellant would not here be able to complain. But 
appellant maintains that to deliver to the jury Instruc-
tion No. 5 as it appers in the record as being deliberately 
scratched out by the court is more than a mere failure to 
give the instruction. It is to call it to the jury's atten-
tion and then by drawing lines across it indicate the 
court's displeasure with it while leaving it available to be 
read. So the clear implication to the jury is that such a 
statement doesn't in fact constitute the law. This, appel-
lant maintains, was error and gave undue emphasis to the 
refusal to give said instruction, ·which paragraph in fact 
in view of the evidence in this case is a correct statement 
of law. 
Had the jury chosen to adopt defendant's view of 
the evidence, there being testimony to the effect that 
color is not warranted unless expressly so provided, and 
there being no such express language in Exhibit 2, the 
partie were bound and limited by that express warranty, 
and the eliminated paragraph from Instruction No. 5 
was accordingly proper. To strike that part of the in-
struction therefore while lea.ving it apparent to the jury 
to read had a capacity to induce the jury to ignore the 
evidence related to restrictions in that express warranty 
to the prejudice of defendant-appellant. 
Since counsel for defendant was not aware of such 
elimination of the paragraph until he had opportunity to 
inspect the record on appeal and to look at the original 
of the instruction as delivered by the court to the jury, 
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no l'Xt>Ppt ion was timely IwHle to it at the time of the 
trial. Clearly, such deletion was prejudicial error and 
~ltouhl be reversed. 
(E) IN REFUSING TO RECALL THE JURY 
T<) REHABILITATE THEM IN CONNEC-
TION WITH TWO ERRORS COMMITTED BY 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF IN HIS ARGU-
MENT. 
The two arguments of counsel for the plaintiff com-
plained of by defendant relate first to his inserting at the 
time of argument a new element unsupported by any evi-
dt'nce which tended to confuse the jury, and second his 
abandoning the court's instruction relating to the meas-
ure of damages. 
Argument to the jury is not generally part of a rec-
ord and was not transcribed by the reporter in this trial. 
But in taking exeeptions to argument of counsel for the 
plaintiff, the undersigned recalled for the record state-
ments of plaintiff's counsel as follows: 
'' ... as I recall in substance that the defendant 
would indemnify the plaintiff for any payment to 
third persons engaged in the remedying of the 
defects or alleged defects covered by said war-
ranty. Said exeeption is taken on the ground that 
to insert such an argument at a time when there 
is neither any evidence in support thereof nor 
justification for argument thereon is to create a 
new element and argument for the purpose of 
prejudicing and confusing the jury; and we take 
exception thereto ; there being no evidence of any 
kind ol expenditures or engagement of any par-
ties, third persons or otherwise to remedy or oth-
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erwise modify any of the alleged defects com-
plained of by Plaintiff. (R-270) '' 
That such argument of plaintiff's counsel was de-
liberate and prejudicial appears more certain in noting 
that plaintiff's proposed instruction No. 15 (R-39), calls 
attention to that element which proposed Instruction the 
court refused to give. Said refusal of course was trans-
mitted to counsel for plaintiff well prior to his argument 
to the jury. He was, therefore, inserting by way of argu-
ment a matter he was not entitled to as an instruction 
on which the court had previously ruled. 
The undersigned further argued that counsel for 
plaintiff had ignored the court's instruction as to the 
measure of damages, which was Instruction No. 10. Coun-
sel for the plaintiff's argument in that connection does 
not appear in the record, but the court's observation 
about it are as follows: 
''THE CouRT: Well, you should have taken your 
exception then and there. But Mr. Hayes, there 
was a thing I almost spoke to you about and that 
was disregarding my rule of damages." (R-270) 
Counsel for the plaintiff, in fact, asked the jury to find 
cost of replacement to be a true measure of the damages, 
or in other words to rule that the drapes were valueless. 
Again, plaintiff's counsel was aware, prior to argument, 
that his theory of the measure of damages was incorrect 
since his proposed Instructions No. 7, No. 12 (R-34 and 
37) were refused. 
Counsel for the defendant then took exception both 
to the argument relating to measure of damages and to 
28 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the insertion of the extraneous element, and the court 
obst•rvt•d that it was a borderlike situation, and so he 
had said nothing. (R-272) Defendant then moved the 
court to recall the jury to correct the matter, which mo-
tion was denied. (R-272) While these matters do not per-
haps seem of great moment by themselves, taken together 
with the cumulative effect of the other errors observed 
above, they added to the prejudice of defendant's inter-
est herein, and a simple recalling of the jury at the time 
to correct any misimpressions created by this improper 
argument of counsel could have minimized, if not elimi-
nn t0d, the danger. Failing so to do constituted error. 
(F) IN REFUSING TO GRANT JUDGMENT, 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
The argument made heretofore in arguments (B) 
and (C) relating to the Motion to Dismiss and the Mo-
tion for Directed Verdict constitute the basis for de-
fendant's motion before the court on May 11, 1964, for 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Refusing to 
do so, the court committed reversible error. The ele-
ments of those arguments appearing heretofore need not 
be duplicated here. 
(G) REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S 
~IOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
~-\s will be noted from defendant's Motion for a New 
Trial, pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
said motion was made on the grounds of newly discovered 
evidence which defendant did not with reasonable dili-
gence discoyer and produce at the time of the trial. Said 
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motion was supported by Affidavit of counsel for defend-
ant, and said evidence was identified in Paragraph 5 of 
that Affidavit as being the cotton thread used in sewing 
the draperies in question. 
As pointed out at the time of arguing defendant's 
Motion for New Trial, the material from which these 
drapes were made was shipped in rolls from the manu-
facturer to Carpets, Inc,orporated, as indicated in Mr. 
Thompson's testimony. (R-191-192) The sewing of the 
drapes was contracted out to Mrs. Ruth Cramer, who tes-
tified that her shop sewed all of the draperies in ques-
tion. (R-218) 
Now the significance of the cotton thread in question 
as new evidence is this : 
Such cotton thread was manufactured by a different 
company, made of a different type fabric (that is, cot-
ton as opposed to rayon and dacron, the material con-
tent of the drapery fabric) and was supplied from a dif-
ferent mill. Following the trial, while Mr. Thompson 
and the undersigned were sitting in counsel's office, 
Thompson noticed dangling from the cut portion of the 
samples clipped from Exhibits 8, 9 and 10, a single strand 
of the said thread. On closer inspection, he discovered 
that the cotton thread discolored in the same manner or 
streaks as the fabric itself. Since plaintiff's position was 
that the discoloration was due to the presence of dye in-
herently installed in the fabric itself at the time of manu-
facture, to be consistent, the cotton threads, the white 
cotton threads sewing the fabric together, unless sub-
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jt>t'll'd to the Harne manufaeturing process should not have 
dis<·olon'd n t all, but remain white throughout. If, how-
PVPr, on the other hand, said thread discolored in the 
same manner and place in the material as the fabric of 
manut'aeture this then would be probative, if not con-
C'lusi n', e\·i<lenee that the cause of the discoloration came 
from some source other than the manufacturer, and oc-
emTed at a time subsequent to the assembly and sewing 
ot' the finished drapes. These facts were not observed 
or diHcm·prcd until after the trial was concluded, as indi-
cn!Pd above. It was on the basis of the same that coun-
sl'l for defendant asked for a new trial. 
This court has allowed new trials based upon newly 
discon'rcd evidenee as early as 1916 in the ease of Van-
Dyke v. Opden Sacings Book, 48 Utah 606; 161 Pac. 50. 
In the case of Cptown Appliance v. Flint, 1952, 122 Utah 
~~)8, :2-!0 P. 2nd 826, this court further ruled that the bur-
den is upon the appellant to show what evidenee it has 
to justify the new trial; and in the case of Jensen v. 
Logan City, 1936, 89 Utah 347, 57 Pac. 2nd 708, this eourt 
further ruled that it must appear that such new evidence 
would likely change the result rather than merely be 
eumulati,·c. The opinion reads, in part: 
• ' ... when it appears that the movant for the new 
trial was not guilty of indiligence in failing to ob-
tain the witness (evidence here) for trial, and 
that there is no element of holding such witness 
(evidence here) in reserve for purposes of obtain-
ing a new trial - generally picturesquely denomi-
nated in slang phraseology as 'an aee in the hole' 
-and it appears likely that such evidence would 
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change the result, a new trial should be granted.'' 
(Inserts added) Ibid, p. 723 
Counsel for appellant maintains that there was no 
holding of such evidence in reserve; that the same was 
not in fact noticed until after the conclusion of the trial, 
and then only quite by accident. Appellant further main-
tains that this evidence would likely change the result of 
the trial and not be merely cumulative. The only real 
issue is whether or not defendant exercised ''reasonable 
diligence'' in o htaining said evidence. 
In the case of Crellin v. Thomas, 1952, 122 Utah 122; 
247 Pac. 2d 264, this court, by majority opinion, allowed 
the defendant a new trial in order to obtain a witness in 
a slander prosecution that the defendant therein had not 
become aware of prior to the trial. Justice Wolfe in his 
dissent, however, pointed out that ample opportunity was 
available to the defendant, so to have determined the 
presence and identity of such witness, had ordinary dis-
covery devices been employed in the way of interroga-
tories to or deposition of the plaintiff. In that dissent 
there appears a quotation from an Oklahoma case de-
fining reasonable diligence as follows: 
''By reasonable diligence is meant appropriate 
action, where there is some reason to awaken in-
quiry and direct diligence in a channel in which 
it would be successful. Levi v. Oklahoma City, 
198 Oklahoma 414; 179 Par. 2d 465, 466." 
Appellant here maintains that the discovery of the dan-
gling thread occurring in counsel's office a.t the time it 
did was quite fortuitous and accidental, and that an in-
32 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
spt'etion of the draperies as such would not ordinarily 
hring- one to notiec the thread by which it was sewn, nor 
to have pursued this inquiry with diligence; and that 
appellant upon so discovering and inquiring, promptly so 
moved for the new trial on that ground. It would be, 
appellant maintains, a gross injustice to deny the de-
fendant herein opportunity to present such evidence to 
a jury. Accordingly, he urges this court in the alter-
native of reversing the court below and granting dis-
missal to defendant, to at least grant a new trial wherein 
defendant can present this critical and highly important 
Pvidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant-appellant 
moves this court to reverse the Trial Court and grant 
judgment to the defendant dismissing plaintiff's com-
plaint in its entirety with prejudice, or in the alternative 
g-ranting a new trial herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
MABEY, RONNOW & MADSEN 
57 4 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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